UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-8-2016

Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc. Respondent's
Brief Dckt. 44240

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44240" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6632.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6632

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

15-203

HUNTSMAN SPRINGS, INC., an Idaho
Corporation,
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Teton

Honorable Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge

Sean Moulton
MOULTON LAW OFFICE

P.O.Box631
Driggs, Idaho 83422
Telephone: (208) 354-2345
Facsimile: (208) 354-2346
seanmoulton@tetonvalleylaw.com

Attorney for Respondent

Ronald L. Swafford and Larren K.
Covert
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

Attorneys for Appellants

DEC O8 2016
~

-

Entered on ATS ·

OF
OF

1. The Swaffords considered lack of access to
breach of contract.

lot

Primrose Street as a

Access to the Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street was obstructed no later than
August 2008.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................................ 5
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 6

1. The statute of limitations began to run no later than August 2008 when the alleged
breach of contract "accrued." ......................................................................................... 6

2. There is no genuine issue of fact that the Swaffords had actual knowledge of the
alleged contract breaches in 2008 ................................................................................... 7
3. There are no genuine issues of material fact that the Swaffords had constructive
knowledge of the alleged contract breaches no later than 2007 .................................. 11
4. The Swaffords conceded that the alleged breach of contract occurred no later than
August 2008 prior to filing their Complaint................................................................. 14
The Swaffords' private action claims pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act are time barred pursuant to a two-year statute of limitations ............................. 15
6. The Swaffords' "Misrepresentation" cause of action is time barred by a three year
statute of limitations ...................................................................................................... 16
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... . ........ .... .. .. . . . .............................. 16
CONCLUSION....... .. ......................................................................................... 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................................. 19

71 Idaho 306,

Chapin
Galbraith

0

103 Idaho 91

998 (1951)...............................................
655 P.2d 119 (Ct.App.1982) ......................

I

13

6, 10, 15

Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 245 P .3d 1009 (2011 ). .. . .... .. .. .... .......... ........... .... .. ...

5

lvfason v. Tucker & Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994).............

7

Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 293 P .3d 645 (2013 ).

17

Singleton v. Pichon, 635 P.2d 254 (Idaho 1981)..................................................................

16

Sparks v. St. Lukes Regional Afedical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988).....

5

Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (l 995)................................. .............

6

Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 112 P.3d 788 (2005)...............................................

6

STATUTES

Idaho Code§ 5-218(4). ............... ......... .. ........................ .......... ...... ......................

17

Idaho Code §§ 6-2501-2504.. ......... .......... ..................... ......... ................. .... .. ....

7

Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)........................... .. ................. ..................... . .... ......... ...

16-17

Idaho Code § 1 121 ... . . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . . ... ... ... .. .. ... .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . ... .. .. . .... .. .. .... .. . .. .. .. . ..

16-1 7

Idaho Code § 48-619......... ...................... ... ............................................. ...............

16, 17

Idaho Code § 48-603..... .. .... ... ...... .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. ... .... ..... .. .. .. .. .. .... .. ... ...... . .. .. .. .. .. ... ... .. ...... .. .. .

16

RULES

Idaho Appellate Rules 40...... ..................................... .............................................

16

Idaho Appellate Rules 41....................... ....................................... ................. .......

16

........... ...... .................. ... ............. ... ...... ................. ....... ... .... ..

I.

. P.

....... .... ... ....................... .... ........... ................... ............. .............

5

6

s
would be adjacent to Primrose Street and Huntsman

built a physical

between

the Swaffords' lot and Primrose Street.
This alleged breach occurred no later than August 2008. The Swaffords' filed their
Complaint in July 2015-seven years after the alleged breach.
The trial court dismissed the Swaffords' untimely Complaint because the breach of
contract occurred in 2008 and the language of the Complaint itself showed the Swaffords
knew or could have known of the breach of contract in 2008. There are no genuine issues of
material fact that the pertinent statutes of limitations bar the Swaffords' Complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Swaffords considered lack of access to their lot from Primrose Street as a
breach of contract.

The Swaffords claimed that Huntsman Springs breached a contract when Huntsman
Springs restricted access to the Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street. In a letter dated August
2014, and attached to the Swaffords' Complaint, Ron Swafford wrote that Huntsman
allegedly

as

In August

14 Ron Swafford considered

Street a breach of contract. Huntsman

of access to his lot
built

dividing

Primrose

2008

access to the Swaffords' lot in 2008. Huntsman Springs changed the ingress and egress from
the Swaffords' lot in 2008.
The Swaffords' Complaint alleges that Huntsman Springs breached its contract by
restricting access from Primrose Street:
•

Huntsman Springs allegedly represented on marketing materials that the Swaffords'
lot would be "directly adjacent to Primrose Street." 2

•

Huntsman Springs allegedly failed to provide the Swaffords' lot with "ingress and
egress from Primrose Street. " 3

•

Huntsman Springs allegedly breached its contract by "visually partitioning" the
Swaffords' lot from the remainder of Huntsman Springs. 4

•

Huntsman Springs allegedly breached its express warranties to the Swaffords by
failing to access to their lot from Primrose Street. 5

•

Huntsman Springs failed to provide "access to lot 50 from Primrose Street, through a
park on the west boundary." 6

•

Huntsman Springs failed to place "entrance access to the lot from Primrose

•

Huntsman Springs misrepresented that "commercial ingress and egress would be
from Primrose Street as ingress or
could not reasonably
placed across a
family walk and bike path." 8

and
dealing
it
Huntsman Springs and the
a barrier
the remainder
commercial lots, and Huntsman Springs "segregated" the Swaffords' lot from the
rest of the development. 10
•

"The Master Plan represented that access to and from 195 Primrose Street. Further, it
would not be reasonable nor feasible to place commercial access and ingress across
family walk ways and bike paths. I I

Central to the Swaffords' breach of contract claims is their lot's lack of access to Primrose
Street. They claim that Huntsman Springs failed to follow the Master Plat and effectively
partitioned the lot from the rest of the development.

2. Access to the Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street was obstructed no later than
August 2008.
There are no genuine issues of material fact that the Swaffords' lot was segregated
from Primrose Street by August 2008. The Swaffords had actual or constructive knowledge
of the following facts:

•

July 20, 2007-The Swaffords' plat was recorded in Teton County showing a park
separating the Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street. 12

•

September 21, 2007-The Swaffords closed on their property and received a
warranty deed and title insurance policy that showed a park separating their property
from Primrose Street. 13

e

August
2008-Huntsman
on the west side of the Swaffords' lot. 16

e

August 13, 2008-"[T]he landscaping, walking paths, anJ trees
aJjacent to
and the west of Lot 4 of Block 50, also identified on the recorded plat as Park 3,
were completed on or before August 13, 2008." 17

the bike

Huntsman Springs submitted facts in the form of the Affidavit of Todd
Woolstenhulme, the construction manager for Huntsman Springs and the individual who
oversaw all aspects of the installation, completion, and approval of the Huntsman Springs
infrastructure.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the
same standard as does the trial court. Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,259,245 P.3d 1009,
1011 (2011 ). Specifically, summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing I.R.C.P.
56( c) ). The principle and purpose of a summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupportable claims. Sparks v.

Lukes Regional 1\;fedical

505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988). "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of

, 115

The statute of limitations began to nm no later than August 2008 when the
alleged breach of contract "accrued."
Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Swaffords' Complaint are all founded on breach of a
written contract: Count I Breach of Contract; Count II Breach of Express Warranty; Count
III Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. In Idaho, "[a]n action upon any contract,

obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" must be commenced within
five years. J.C. § 5-216. The statute of limitations does not begin to run "until the cause of
action accrues," or in other words, a claim "accrues upon the breach of the contract." Spence
v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 770, 890 P .2d 714, 721 ( 1995). The Idaho Court of Appeals put it

another way in Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 91

915, 655 P.2d 119, 1

(Ct.App.1982): "The cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run,
when a party may sue another."
According to the Complaint, Huntsman Springs, Inc. misrepresented to the
Swaffords the nature of the Swaffords' lot relative to the rest of the subdivision: their lot
was not "adjacent" to Primrose Street, bike paths and landscaping interfered with ingress
and

to the

trees and landscaping

a

lot

statute
"breach," not

limitations

a contract case

to run from

alleged

when the plaintiff gives the defendant notice and an opportunity to

repair. Idaho does have the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act for construction cases.
I.C. §§ 6-2501-2504. This is not a construction case. Even if this framework applied here, it
is unclear how any "notice and opportunity to repair'' restarts a statute of limitations. The
concept of giving opportunity to repair prior to filing a lawsuit is intended to prevent
unnecessary lawsuits; notice and opportunity to repair does not provide plaintiffs additional
time to file the lawsuit. In this case, it is uncontested that the alleged breaches occurred in
2007 and 2008.
The Swaffords argue that they "were not fully aware of their damages" until they
corresponded via letter with Huntsman Springs in 2014. Uncertainty about damages is not a
basis for tolling or restarting the statute of limitations. "A cause of action for breach of
contract accrues upon the breach even though no damage may occur until later. Mason v.

Tucker & Associates, 1

Idaho 429, 436, 871 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct App. 1994) (citation

omitted). In this case, the alleged damages occurred in 2007 and 2008 and they were
observable to

Swaffords.

failed to

a

access to the lot

Huntsman Springs misrepresented

that "commercial ingress and egress would be from Primrose Street as ingress or egress
could not reasonably be placed across a family walk and bike path"; 22 Huntsman Springs
breached the contract because "access to and from the commercial lots would be from
Primrose Street, due to the family walk way and bike path being on the east side of Lot
50.

In short, the Swaffords' central allegation is that Huntsman Springs breached the

contract when it failed to make their lot accessible from Primrose Street.
Three months after the final plat was recorded, in October 2007, Primrose Street was
prepped and paved. 24 If the Swaffords were unaware of the alleged breach of contract in
July 2007 when the plat was recorded, surely they were aware of the alleged breach in

October 2007 when Primrose Street was paved and their property was separated from it by a
strip of land. In October 2007 Mr. Swafford could have written as he did in August 2014,
that a "dividing partition" separated his lot from Primrose Street, and "[t]he development
has changed the address, ingress and egress, as the lot has absolutely no access from
Primrose." 25 In October 2007 the Swaffords' breach of contract claims "accrued" because

In August 2008, the Swaffords could have stood on their

and observed that family

walk way and bike path blocked access to their lot in the manner they now allege in the
Complaint. In August 2008, the Swaffords could have observed from their property that a
paved Primrose Street was not adjacent to their lot.
The Swaffords' breach of contract claim also claims that Huntsman Springs breached
the contract by its placement of landscaping between the Swaffords' lot and Primrose Street.
"Defendant segregated and partitioned the commercial lot from the east side of Huntsman
Springs with trees and a ditch not represented in the plan." 26 The landscaping was
completed by August 13, 2008.
Todd Woolstenhulme, the construction manager who oversaw the construction of the
infrastructure of Huntsman Springs Subdivision stated by affidavit,
the landscaping, walking path, and trees directly adjacent to and the west of
Lot 4 of Block 50, also identified on the recorded plat as Park 3, were
completed on or before August 13, 2008. Plaintiff would have had visual
knowledge that the actual construction of the bike path and park landscaping
did not match their expectations, as included in their Complaint, on or before
August 13, 2008. 27
contract

not

July 2007, and if the claims had not accrued

8.

October 2007

Primrose

and

to

installing a bike path and family walkway on the west side of their lot rather than on the
east side of their lot. According to the Swaffords' Complaint, "The Master Plan represented
that access to and from 195 Primrose Street. Further, it would not be reasonable nor feasible
to place commercial access and ingress across family walk ways and bike paths." 28 The
Swaffords could have literally written this exact statement in August 2008-they could have
filed this breach of contract allegation seven years ago.
Additionally, the construction of the walkways and paths in August 2008 constituted
the alleged breach because the bike paths and family walk ways were not in the place the
Swaffords had anticipated-the path and walkway was installed on the west side of the
Swaffords' lot rather than the east side of the Swaffords' lot. 29 Again, this language from
the Complaint could have been written in August 2008: "Defendant has breached the
contract ... by failing to install a family walk way and bike path as identified on the Master
Plan. " 30 That alleged breach happened when the walkways and pathways were installed, in
August 2008.
There is no genuine issue of material fact that the Swaffords knew or could have
the

contract

2008

own lot.

was not

on
place their lot adjacent to Primrose Street. The

to

Plat" that Huntsman Springs recorded

Teton County on July 20, 2017 clearly shows that a .76 acre park, Park

the

Swaffords' lot from Primrose Street. The Swaffords attached this recorded plat to their
Complaint as Attachment "E."
Not only did the Final Plat explicitly show the alleged breaches the Swaffords now
assert, the Swaffords received a warranty deed and title insurance policy when they closed
on the property in September 2007. 32
This Court has ruled that the statute of limitations begins running based on what the
plaintiffs could have known of the breach, not when the actually knew of the breach. Chapin
v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306,310,230 P.2d 998, 1001 (1951). If the recording of the Final Plat

was insufficient to give the Swaffords constructive knowledge of the alleged contract
breaches, then the warranty deed and title insurance policy they received at closing would
have been sufficient.
In Chappin, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a deed recorded in Ada County was
sufficient to begin the running of the statute of limitations. The Court reasoned,
While it is stipulated that the appellants did not know of their interest those lots
until about a year before this suit was brought, that makes no difference, for they
had the means of acquiring that knowledge, as the deed conveying the title to said
lots to their father was of record during all that time in the office of the county
recorder of Ada county,
said lots were situated.
means of acquiring
this knowledge was open to them, and,
facts of this case, that places
the same position as

at 311,

at 1001.

In this case, Huntington Springs

the "Final

document contains the alleged breach of contract complained of

recorded
the Swaffords'

Complaint-it clearly shows that a park prevents the Swaffords' lot from being adjacent to
Primrose Street. The Swaffords also received notice at closing in September 2007 when they
received their warranty deed and title insurance policy. If they did not know that there lot
was not adjacent to Primrose Street in 2007, it was because by their "own carelessness or
negligence they failed to acquire knowledge that was within their reach." Id
In Chapin, the knowledge necessary to begin the running of the statute of limitations
was filed away in an Ada County office building. That was sufficient "knowledge" to begin
the running of the statute of limitations. In this case, the Swaffords could have known-and
almost certainly did know-of the alleged breaches in 2008 because those alleged breaches
were visually observable on their own property.
The following table compares the Swaffords' own allegations in their Complaint
compared to what they knew or could have known in 2007 and 2008 when their claims
accrued:

September
2007-The
closed on
property and received a warranty deed and title
insurance policy with exemptions referencing the final
plat, which showed a park separating their property from
Primrose Street. 35
October 31, 2007-Primrose Street was prepped or
paved consistent with the recorded plat; the park
separated the Swaffords' property from Primrose
Street. 36

Huntsman Springs represented that it
would build the bike path and family walk
on the east side of the Swaffords' lot, but
instead the path and walk were built on the
west side of the Swaffords' lot. 37

August 13, 2008-Huntsman Springs completed the bike
path and family walkway on the west side of the
Swaffords' lot. 38

Huntsman Springs allegedly blocked
ingress and egress to the Swaffords' lot
from Primrose Street by constructing the
bike path and landscaping on the west
side, in "Park 3." 39

August 13, 2008-Huntsman Springs completed the bike
path and family walkway on the west side of the
Swaffords' lot.

The Swaffords allege that Huntsman
Springs "intentionally created a barrier
between the remainder of Huntsman
Springs and the commercial lots." 40

August 13, 2008-"[T]he landscaping, walking paths,
and trees directly adjacent to and the west of Lot 4 of
Block 50, also identified on the recorded plat as Park 3,
were completed on or before August 13, 2008. " 41

Complaint, ,r 6, R.
Complaint, Exhibit E, R. p.46; Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 6, R. p.87.
35 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 6, R. p.87
36 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,i7, R. pp.87-88.
37 Complaint,
31, 32, R. pp. 6-7.
38 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 7, R. pp.87-88.
39 According to the Swaffords' Complaint, Huntsman Springs represented that "commercial ingress and
egress would be from Primrose Street as ingress or egress could not reasonably be placed across a family
walk way and bike path," and "access to and from the commercial lots would be from Primrose Street, due to
the family walk way and bike path being on the east side of Lot 50." Complaint, ,r,r 13, 31, 32, R. pp.6-7.
4 Complaint, ,r,r 13, 37, R. p.4.
41 Affidavit of Todd Woolstenhulme, ,r 8, R. p.88.
33

34
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to

contract

Swaffords sent a

to Huntsman Springs in August

Comolaint thev later filed"
~

.,I

-

-

, the Swaffords

no
attached the
that

to
believed

Huntsman Springs breached their contract when they separated the Swaffords' lot from
Primrose Street. This is the language from the Swaffords' letter:
Huntsman Springs has seriously neglected the development of these lots, and
has seriously damaged their value and marketability by building a dividing
partition consisting of a tree line and a roadway on the Huntsman Springs
side, which now separates my lot from Huntsman Springs. The development
has changed the address, ingress and egress, as the lot has absolutely no
access from Primrose.

You have effectively changed the address, as well as the access to my lot
from the Primrose paved roadway to a gravel road appearing outside of
Huntsman Springs. 42
The trial court reasoned that this letter served as acknowledgment by the Swaffords that the
breach of contract occurred many years prior. These are the words of the trial court:
Swaffords contend that the statute of limitations only accrued when they
received a letter dated September 3, 2014, informing them that Huntsman
Springs did not intend to allow access to their lot from Primrose Street.
However, the facts show that Huntsman Springs sent the letter in response to
a letter sent by Swaffords on August 20, 2014, already alleging a breach of
contract. By suggesting in their letter that they would sue if they did not
receive a response, Swaffords have essentially conceded to knowing that an
alleged breach of contract had already occurred. 43

42
41

Complaint, Attachment F, R. pp.47-49.
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p.5, R. p.341.
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cause
619.

Idaho,

Singleton v. Pichon, 635 P .2d

cause

§

action accrues when one party

(Idaho l

sue another. See

1); Galbraith v.

122-23 (Idaho Ct.App.1982).
The Swaffords' Complaint alleges that Huntsman Springs violated the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act in the following ways: "Defendant's marketing and sales conduct for the sale of
the undeveloped lots in Teton County as they relate to Plaintiffs consists of unfair and deceptive
practices of conduct in trade or commerce."44 "The conduct of Defendant through its agents and
representatives was deceptive in that Defendant provided the Master Plan, recorded plat, website
and promotional materials outlining future developments of undeveloped lots, with no intention
of compliance. " 45 While the Complaint gives no specifics, it seems reasonable to assume that the
Swaffords allege that Huntsman Springs' marketing materials violated LC. § 48-603.
The marketing materials were provided to the Swaffords in May 2007. As argued above,
all of the defects alleged by the Swaffords had come to fruition by August 2008. By August 2008
the Swaffords could stand on their property with the marketing materials in hand and could
observe that the property was not as they had anticipated. Again, Huntsman Springs does not
it

Consumer Protection Act. All Huntsman Springs is

not

that it

Idaho

misrepresentations

cause
Swaffords' fifth cause

a

Springs was

1S

unable to find a cause of action in Idaho for misrepresentation, so it assumes that this is a
claim of "fraud." In Idaho, a cause of action for fraud is "not to be deemed to have accrued
until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake."
Idaho Code Ann.§ 5-218(4).
"Defendant provided extensive promotional material, a website, brochures and a
Master Plan to Plaintiffs to influence the purchase of undeveloped real property in
Huntsman Springs Phase I. " 46 "The representations were false. " 47
Again, as stated above, the marketing materials were provided in May 2007. By
August 2008 the Swaffords had discovered or could have discovered the facts constituting
the alleged fraud. The three year statute of limitations, Idaho Code §

18(4 ), has long

since run.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

moves the

an

and costs on

of

a

case,

1s

contract

lot."

a

Swaffords refer to the lot at issue throughout his Complaint as a "commercial

"

the

end of the Complaint, the Swaffords petition the Court for attorney's fees pursuant to
Section 12-120(3).
The Idaho Supreme Court has granted attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120(3) when a party prevailed at summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A , 154 Idaho 21, 27, 293 P .3d 645, 651

(2013). If the Court rules in Huntsman Springs' favor, Huntsman Springs moves the Court
for an award of attorney's fees and costs.
Huntsman Springs is entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
1 121. As stated above, Huntsman Springs is the "prevailing party. Rule 54( e )(1) states,

"attorney fees under section l

121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it

finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." The trial court ruled that the Swaffords'
Complaint was three years too late. 48 Additionally, the trial court concluded that the
Swaffords' letter, "essentially conceded to knowing that an alleged breach of contract had
alreadv. occurred." 49 The Swaffords lacked anv. basis in law or fact to file their untimelv
.;

moves

an

of costs

to

